

Message Text

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S/S:SESTEINER
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 293844 TOSEC 310437

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, RH, UK

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: RHODESIA CONFERENCE: REVISED
TALKING POINTS FOR USE BY REINHARDT AND SCHAUFLELE
(S/S NO. 7624821)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ROBINSON

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCENARIO PROPOSED IN
TOSEC 310424 , WE PROPOSE FOR YOUR APPROVAL THE FOLLOW-
ING TALKING POINTS (A REVISION OF THOSE SUBMITTED BY
AMBASSADOR REINHARDT IN TOSEC 378) FOR REINHARDT'S USE
WITH CHONA AND AMBASSADOR SCHAUFLELE'S USE WITH KAUNDA AND
NYERERE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

A. -- THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE
THE FRANKNESS OF THE VIEWS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED TO US RECENT-
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LY. HE HAS NOTED THESE VIEWS CAREFULLY AND BELIEVES IT IS
IMPORTANT TO ANSWER THE POINTS YOU HAVE RAISED PROMPTLY
AND WITH EQUAL CANDOR.

B. -- IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER WHAT THE EXERCISE WE ARE

ENGAGED IN HERE IS ALL ABOUT:

(1) WE ARE HERE TO TRY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT THAT TRANSFERS POWER IN RHODESIA FROM THE HANDS OF WHITES WHO NOW HOLD IT TO AFRICANS WHO RIGHTFULLY DESERVE IT.

(2) WE ARE HERE TO GET A SOLUTION THAT OFFERS THE BEST ASSURANCE OF A SMOOTH TRANSITION TO A MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, ONE THAT CAN BRING STABILITY AND PROSPERITY TO ZIMBABWE, AND ONE THAT WOULD NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF ITS NEIGHBORS, MOST NOTABLY ZAMBIA (O?IT LAST THREE WORDS WITH NYERERE).

C. -- WE ARE DISTURBED BY WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE A GROWING SENSE OF UNREALITY HERE IN GENEVA, NOT ONLY AMONG SOME OF THE NATIONALIST DELEGATIONS, BUT ALSO AMONG THE OBSERVERS. SOMEHOW, THERE APPEARS AN INCREASING TENDENCY TO IGNORE SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES OF THE RHODESIAN SITUATION:

(1) THE FIRST OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT IAN SMITH AND THE RHODESIA FRONT HOLD DE FACTO POWER IN RHODESIA, NOT THE SOUTH AFRICANS, NOT THE BRITISH, AND CERTAINLY NOT THE UNITED STATES. NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE MAY DISLIKE THAT SITUATION, IT IS NOT SOMETHING THAT CAN BE WISHED AWAY.

(2) SECOND, THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE THAT EXTERNAL POWERS CAN EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE IN TRYING TO BRING SMITH TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH EFFECTIVELY GUARANTEES HIS OWN DEMISE. IN LARGE MEASURE THOSE LIMITS ARE DETERMINED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES IN BRITAIN, IN SOUTH AFRICA AND IN THE U.S. WHICH MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL AT HOME OR TO PRESS UPON SMITH ANY SETTLEMENT TERMS WHICH DO NOT PROVIDE DUE ASSURANCES FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF MINORITY INTERESTS IN SECRET

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RHODESIA.

(3) THE THIRD POINT CONCERNS THOSE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH PERSUADED SMITH TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PRINCIPLE WITHIN A FIXED TIME FRAME. WHATEVER ONE CHOOSES TO SAY ABOUT THE FIVE POINTS OF SMITH'S SEPTEMBER 24 SPEECH, THERE CAN BE NO DISAGREEMENT OVER THE FACT THAT IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPTS EMBODIED IN THESE FIVE POINTS THAT SMITH AND HIS PARTY WERE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE. THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL OF THESE IS THE CONCEPT THAT RHODESIAN WHITES WOULD BE ASSURED OF A MEANINGFUL VOICE AND ROLE IN THE POLITICAL DECISIONS TAKEN DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD THAT WILL AFFECT THEIR FUTURE IN ZIMBABWE.

D. -- WE HAVE HEARD THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN GENEVA THAT SMITH AND THE RHODESIA FRONT MAY NOW BE READY TO ABANDON THE CONCEPT OF SHARED POWER IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS PROMISES OR UNDERSTANDINGS. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD IT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DELIVER SMITH UPON DEMAND AND GET HIM TO ACCEPT ANY ALTERNATIVE SET OF PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD AT THE CONFERENCE. WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST POINT, NOTHING SMITH HAS SAID OR IMPLIED SINCE THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE OFFERS ANY SUGGESTION THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ABANDON THE CONCEPT THAT RHODESIA WHITES MUST HAVE AN EFFECTIVE VOICE IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND, ANYONE WHO THINKS THAT WE CAN PERSUADE OR COERCE SMITH INTO ACCEPTING A SETTLEMENT ON ANY OTHER TERMS FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THE REAL LIMITATIONS OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE.

E. -- OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT SMITH AND THE RHODESIANS ARE FULLY PREPARED TO FIGHT ON AND TO RESIST ALL FORMS OF PRESSURE IF THEY DO NOT GET THE KIND OF SETTLEMENT IN GENEVA THAT THEY FEEL MEETS THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.

F. -- RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE RHODESIANS SENSE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT IN WORLD OPINION ABOUT THEIR SITUATION SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. BY REPEATING HIS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT SMITH HAS ATTEMPTED TO PROJECT
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AN IMAGE OF REASONABLENESS. THE NATIONALIST DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, HERE HAVE PLAYED INTO HIS HANDS BY APPEARING TO DEMAND NOT NEGOTIATION BUT UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE VERY EVIDENT EROSION OF SUPPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR A SETTLEMENT, WHICH COULD TIE VORSTER'S HANDS AND PREVENT HIM FROM CONTINUING HIS POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO ZIMBABWE BUT ALSO NAMIBIA.

G. -- RESPONSIBLE LEADERS CANNOT AFFORD TO BE ROMANTIC OR SENTIMENTAL ABOUT WAR. IF WE FAIL TO GET A SETTLEMENT IN GENEVA THOSE WHO WILL SUFFER MOST WILL BE THE ZIMBABWEANS, WHO FACE THE PROSPECT OF HAVING A WHOLE GENERATION OF YOUTH CHEWED UP IN NEEDLESS BLOODSHED, AND WHOSE ONLY REWARD WILL BE A COUNTRY RAVAGED BY WAR AND DESTRUCTION.

H. -- RHODESIA'S NEIGHBORS, ZAMBIA IN PARTICULAR, WOULD PAY A HEAVY PRICE IF THE WAR IS ALLOWED TO DRAG ON, AND NOT MERELY IN ECONOMIC TERMS. ZAMBIA ALREADY KNOWS WHAT IT MEANS TO HAVE FOREIGN ARMIES LIVING IN ARMED CAMPS ON ITS SOIL AND HOW DIFFICULT IT CAN BE TO CONTROL THEM. THE LEBANESE EXPERIENCE STANDS AS AN EXAMPLE TO ALL OF HOW

DISRUPTIVE A FORCE THESE ARMIES CAN BECOME. (NOTE OMIT REFERENCE TO ZAMBIA IN DISCUSSIONS WITH NYERERE.)

I. -- IT MUST ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IF CONTINUING VIOLENCE LEADS TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY.

J. -- (FOR ZAMBIA ONLY) WE CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN TO AVOID HANDING THOSE WHO WISH TO SEE THE CONFERENCE FAIL THE EXCUSE THEY ARE LOOKING FOR. BUT WE FAIL TO COMPREHEND HOW ZAMBIA'S INTERESTS, OR ZIMBABWE'S EITHER, WOULD BE SERVED BY A SOLUTION THAT MERELY PLACES POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITANTS WITHOUT IMPOSING ANY DISCIPLINE OR RESTRAINT ON THE EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.

K. -- WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENT SOME PEOPLE MAKE FOR GIVING INTO ZIPA'S DEMAND FOR INSTANT MAJORITY RULE, WHICH SEEMS TO US TO RISK INSTABILITY THAT WOULD BE CON-
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TRARY TO INTERESTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AS WELL AS DESTROY ANY CHANCE OF GETTING A SETTLEMENT.

L. -- ONE CANNOT TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATION UNLESS ONE TALKS OF COMPROMISE. SIMILARLY, TRANSITION MEANS NOT AN INSTANTANEOUS AND TOTAL REVERSAL OF EXISTING POWER RELATIONSHIPS. OBVIOUSLY SMITH WILL HAVE MORE POWER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION THAN AT THE END.

M. -- HOWEVER FLAWED THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN THE FIVE POINTS MAY APPEAR, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THEY WERE THE BASIS ON WHICH SMITH WAS TALKED INTO THE PROCESS OF SURRENDERING HIS OWN POSITION AND POWER. HIS ONLY CONDITION WAS AND REMAINS THAT WHITES MUST SHARE SOME POWER DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT SMITH REALLY WANTS OR EXPECTS, BUT WE MUST ASSUME THAT AT A MINIMUM HE WANTS ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS IN THE FORM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES THAT WILL GIVE HIM THE ABILITY TO LIMIT WHAT WHITES FEAR MOST ABOUT THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CLEARLY DEFINED AND INSTITUTIONALIZED SAFEGUARDS, SMITH CANNOT HOPE TO SELL A SETTLEMENT TO HIS OWN CONSTITUENTS IN RHODESIA.

N. -- THERE IS A LOT THE BRITISH CAN DO TO MAKE THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT FUNCTION MORE SMOOTHLY AND EFFECTIVELY. WE BELIEVE THEY ARE PREPARED TO PLAY SOME KIND OF A ROLE, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO ENCOURAGE THEM IN THAT DIRECTION. BUT ONE CANNOT EXPECT THE BRITISH TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES IN RHODESIA THAT THEY HAVE NEVER HAD AND FOR WHICH THEY LACK THE AUTHORITY TO BACK THEM UP. THEY ARE WILLING TO BRIDGE THE GAP, BUT NOT WITHOUT

A VERY PRECISE AND VERY REALISTIC AGREEMENT AS TO WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM. THEY CAN PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL MARGIN OF ASSURANCE FOR BOTH SIDES; BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE BRITISH ROLE CANNOT TAKE THE PLACE OF A BASIC AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WHICH DEFINES IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS THE POWERS THAT EACH WILL EXERCISE IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. BRITAIN CANNOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A RHODESIAN PRESENCE IN INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

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O. -- (FOR ZAMBIA ONLY) THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF OUR COMMON EFFORT TO FIND A SETTLEMENT, NO NATION HAS HAD CLEARER VISION THAN ZAMBIA. NO NATION ATTACHES GREATER IMPORTANCE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME, ONE THAT BRINGS A MODERATE, PRAGMATIC AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO ZIMBABWE. WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THE FACT THAT ZAMBIA FACES GREATER RISKS THAN ANYONE ELSE IF OUR EFFORTS FAIL; AND AS A RESULT, WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR WORD WILL BE HEEDDED AND ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND BY AFRICAN LEADERS GENERALLY. IT IS UP TO ZAMBIA, BEING CLOSEST TO THE PROBLEM, TO REMIND THE OTHERS OF HOW DANGEROUS THE SITUATION WILL BECOME IF A SETTLEMENT BASED ON COMPROMISE IS NOT ACHIEVED.

P. --IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO RETHINK ITS POSITION AND NEGOTIATE PROPOSALS WHICH PROVIDE FOR POWER SHARING WITH RHODESIAN EUROPEANS DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION.

Q. -- FAILURE TO DO SO WILL SIMPLY LET SMITH OFF THE HOOK, FOR IT WOULD THROW THE CONFERENCE INTO AN IMPASSE AND LEAVE NO BASIS FOR THE U.S. TO GO BACK TO THE RHODESIAN OR SOUTH AFRICANS WITH SOMETHING THAT LOOKS BETTER TO THEM THAN FIGHTING IT OUT.

R. -- THE U.S. IS WILLING TO APPLY PRESSURES TO GET THE RHODESIANS TO COMPROMISE ON SOMETHING THAT IS WITHIN THE GENERAL RANGE OF WHAT THEY HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT, BUT WE CANNOT DO SO FOR SOMETHING THAT IS TOTALLY OUTSIDE THE REALM OF WHAT WE DISCUSSED WITH YOU AND THE OTHER PARTIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS. END TEXT

3. RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU APPROVE THE REVISED TALKING POINTS.

APPROVE:

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DISAPPROVE:

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4. DRAFTED BY AF:WBEDMONDSON, CLEARED BY AF:TWSEELYE,ACT.
ROBINSON

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